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Abstract 
This study examines the performance of managers over time, as well as its persistence, 
taking into account both manager characteristics and market conditions. Applying 
parametric and non-parametric methodologies, we examine a sample of UK equity 
pension fund managers. Our results help to understand the importance of manager 
assignments in the industry and reveal the importance and benefits of management 
specialization. We find certain manager performance persistence, revealing that some 
managers are better than others and possess superior investment skills. Additionally, we 
find that managers achieve better results when they run a single fund or one investment-
objective funds, which allows managers to focus on specific tasks. Nonetheless, 
manager performance varies with market conditions and highlights managers’ different 
skills. Specialist managers perform better in bullish markets, and generalists perform 
better in bearish periods. 
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Much financial literature addresses the role and importance of pension fund 
management; however, few studies analyze the performance of individual managers. 
Pension funds have become the main financial vehicle to cover the retirement 
contingency; therefore, a proper management of these financial vehicles is crucial and 
may affect the future retirement incomes of many savers. If management companies are 
able to identify the best performing managers throughout their professional career and 
understand their behavior over time, they may re-allocate managers in different 
positions to improve fund performance and, consequently, attract investment flows to 
this industry. 
The empirical evidence suggests that, in general, mutual and pension fund 
managers do not exhibit superior performance and usually underperform. This evidence 
is mainly found in US mutual and pension funds (Lakonishok et al. 1992; Grinblatt et 
al. 1995; Daniel et al. 1997; Carhart 1997; Chevalier and Ellison 1999; Wermers 2000; 
Pastor and Stambaugh 2002). Some UK mutual and pension fund studies also support 
these results (Blake and Timmermann 1998; Blake et al. 1999; Thomas and Tonks 
2001; Blake and Timmermann 2005). Nonetheless, these results are generally based on 
fund data rather than on mutual fund managers. Among the few studies focusing on 
managers, Baks et al. (2001) analyze manager performance in US mutual funds; 
however, these authors do not provide a complete picture about the manager 
performance as in our paper, because they only analyze the last manager in charge of 
the fund. 
An analysis based on fund data over several years may have several drawbacks. 
First, funds can experience manager replacement; hence, fund performance cannot be 
attributed to a specific manager (Clare et al. 2014). Whether managers move frequently, 
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manager performance is lost when the analysis is performed at the fund level. A 
performance analysis at the manager level can answer the common questions raised in 
financial literature, such as whether the ability resides in the management company or in 
the portfolio manager, and whether some managers are indeed better than others.  
Whether some managers are better than others, they should present performance 
persistence over time. The pension fund literature shows mixed evidence about fund 
performance persistence and primarily reveals persistence in the short-term. 
Christopherson et al. (1998) find persistent performance in poor prior-period 
performance in US pension funds. Tonks (2005) find strong persistence in UK pension 
funds from 1983 to 1997, over one-year time horizons. Clare et al. (2010) find little 
evidence of positive performance persistence in UK defined benefit pension funds 
investing in Pacific Basin equities.  
According to Berk and Green (2004), the lack of performance persistence in the 
long term seems to imply that superior performance is derived from luck rather than 
skill. However, this finding may also be explained because most of the existing works 
analyze this topic using fund data instead of manager data. Among this scarce evidence 
is the study carried out by Pojarliev and Levich (2010), who analyze the performance of 
15 currency fund managers over three years and find absence of alpha persistence but 
evidence of currency style persistence. This work is the first study, as far as we are 
aware, that analyzes performance and persistence in regard to managers. 
The lack of long-term persistence may also be because managers are not able to 
outperform both in crises and expansions periods. Therefore, we study manager 
performance and its persistence over time. Prior studies find different fund performance 
with business cycles (Ferson and Schadt 1996; Christopherson et al. 1998; Moskowitz 
2000; Glode 2011). Moskowitz (2000) finds that active mutual fund managers obtain 
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higher performance in recessions because investors are willing to pay more for assets 
negatively correlated with consumption when they have more needs of profitability; that 
is, in recessions (Cochrane 2001). Kosowski (2011) argues that managers vary their 
portfolio decisions according to their forecasts of market movements. Specifically, 
Kosowski (2011) finds that US mutual funds present superior skills in crises because the 
higher information dispersion during recessions produces that some managers are better 
informed and, thus, outperform. Furthermore, this author points out that time-varying 
performance is asymmetric for funds with different characteristics, which might also be 
expected at a manager level. Kacperczyk et al. (2011) find higher performance in 
recessions because skilled managers have a larger informational advantage over 
unskilled managers during a recession, which generates higher return for informed 
managers in these periods. Later, Kacperczyk et al. (2014) explain that cyclical 
outperformance results are due to time-varying strategies because managers focus on 
different tasks at different time periods to adapt the portfolios to market movements and 
economic conditions.  
In view of these results, we would expect different managerial performance with 
market conditions, as previously documented in US mutual funds (Ferson and Schadt 
1996; Christopherson et al. 1998; Moskowitz 2000; Glode 2011; Kosowski 2011; 
Kackperczyk et al. 2011, 2014; among others).  
Additionally, we examine whether managers with specific characteristics 
(managerial attributes) outperform their competitors. Different works relate fund 
performance with managerial attributes, such as tenure and age (Korniotis and Kumar 
2011), gender (Dwyer et al. 2002; Watson and McNaughton 2007; Babalos et al. 2015), 
fund type under management (Custodio et al. 2013; Zambrana and Zapatero 2016), or a 
variety of these (Gottestman and Morey 2006; Fang and Wang 2015). These previous 
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works find that performance is affected by managerial traits, but the relation between 
them is not clear. Possible explanations for these diverse results may lie on the fact that 
manager features change over time (managers learn with experience, start/stop 
simultaneously managing several funds…). However, these studies examine the relation 
between performance and manager characteristics from a fund perspective and do not 
follow the manager record over time. 
 In this work, we first study the performance of UK equity pension fund 
managers over time, taking into account that managers can simultaneously manage 
different funds and can move from one management company to another. Undertaking 
parametric and non-parametric methods, we analyze manager’s performance persistence 
to examine whether the worst (best) managers in the past will be the worst (best) 
performers in the future. This is especially important because management companies 
may identify the worst and best managers, independently of the fund that they 
were/are/will be managing. Choosing the adequate manager has important implications 
for management companies. Better outcomes may translate into higher company size, 
larger income and better reputation, which may lead to attract more investors and 
increase company’s market position. Therefore, management companies should possess 
mechanisms to retain talent, such as special retribution to best performers.  
Our persistence analysis shows the existence of managers with superior skills; 
however, the best managers have problems adapting to bearish markets. In line with our 
prior argument, our results show that the scarce long-term persistence found in prior 
literature (Goetzman and Ibbotson 1994; Brown and Goetzmann 1995; Blake and 
Morey 2000) can be due to time-varying market conditions. This result reveals that 
some managers are not able to adapt correctly their managerial strategies to market 
movements, especially in bear markets.  
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Afterwards we explore whether certain managerial characteristics are associated 
with better or worse manager performance. Our results show differential skills among 
managers and market conditions. The manager performance is more affected by the 
level of specialization than by personal characteristics, such as gender. In general, we 
find that specialized managers (those who run funds in one investment vocation) report 
better performance than those managers who run funds in different investment 
vocations. Nonetheless, generalist managers achieve better performance in bearish 
markets, whereas specialists outperform in bullish periods.  
Although no prior works have analyzed the specialization behavior in the 
economic cycles, our results are line with some related works that study one of these 
aspects, i.e. performance in economic cycles or performance according to the level of 
specialization. Zambrana and Zapatero (2016) find differential skills between specialist 
and generalist managers; specifically, the fund performance is higher when market 
timers are allocated to generalist tasks and stock pickers are allocated to specialist tasks, 
hence market-timing (stock-picking) managers should be assigned to generalist 
(specialist) responsibilities. Similarly, Göricke (2016), from a family perspective, find 
that specialist funds, which focus on stocks from a narrow selection of sectors, present 
stock-picking skills, versus the generalist funds that invest in stocks from a wider sector 
range. Moreover, Kacperczyk et al. (2014) observe differential skills over time and find 
stock picking in booms and market timing in recessions. 
Therefore, the higher stock picking abilities in booms (Kacperzyk et al. 2014) 
along with the evidence that specialist managers present stock-picking skills (Zambrana 
and Zapatero 2016; Göricke 2016) are consistent with the better performance of 
specialist managers in bullish periods found in this paper. Furthermore, we find that 
generalist managers perform better in bearish periods, which is consistent with 
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Kacperzyk et al. (2014), who find higher evidence of market timing in bearish markets, 
and Zambrana and Zapatero (2016), who find that better market timers are usually 
generalist managers.  
Our results support the existence of different performance level according to the 
type of managers and diverse results in booms and crises, which may help management 
companies to allocate UK domestic equity pension fund managers in appropriate 
positions. Management firms may identify the managers that create value in each 
market phase taking less time in the manager selection decision-making. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents our methodology. 
In Section 3, we describe the UK pension industry and the data used. Section 4 contains 
our empirical results, and Section 5 concludes. 
2. Methodology. 
2.1. Performance analysis. 
 To determine a manager’s performance, we first estimate the monthly fund 
performance of each portfolio managed by a given manager or a management team in 
which the names of the team were known. We then obtain the average manager 
performance per month as the monthly average performance of all funds managed by a 
manager each month. The performance measures used are the Jensen (1968) alpha and 
the four-factor Carhart (1997) alpha. The monthly fund alphas are estimated with the 
daily fund returns of each month1. The Jensen (1968) alpha is obtained from the Capital 
Asset Pricing Model (CAPM): 
 itmtititti erβαr ++= ,1,  (1) 
 where rit is the net excess return of fund i in period t over the risk-free asset, rmt 
is the excess return of market benchmark in period t over the risk-free asset, αit is the 
1The daily observations by month vary between 19 and 23 observations. 
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Jensen’s alpha and shows the fund performance, βit is the fund beta to the market 
benchmark, and eit is a random error term. 
The four-factor model of Carhart (1997) allows us to determine the fund 
performance considering the investment styles followed by a fund manager, adding the 
momentum factor to the three-factor model of Fama and French (1993): 
 ittittittitmtititti eYRPRHMLSMBrr +++++= 1,4,3,2,1, ββββα  (2) 
where : rit is the net excess return of fund i at time t over the risk-free asset; rmt is 
the excess return of the market benchmark over the risk-free asset at time t; SMBt is the 
return on factor-mimicking portfolios for size, defined as the return difference between 
small stocks and large stocks, HMLt is the returns on factor-mimicking portfolios for 
value, defined as the return difference between high and low book-to-market ratio 
stocks, PR1YRt refers to the 1-year momentum factor and captures the return difference 
of past winner stocks and past loser stocks, and eit is the error term.2 
Once the monthly alphas of each pension fund are calculated, we calculate the 
monthly alphas of each manager by assigning the monthly fund alpha to the specific 
manager/s of the fund in each month. If a manager is managing several funds at the 
same time, we allocate to the manager the average performance of that month. As a 
result, we obtain the performance of each manager over time and can therefore rank 
fund managers according to their performance, as well as examine their performance 
persistence over time. 
2.2. Performance persistence analysis. 
We evaluate whether UK domestic equity pension fund managers present 
performance persistence with two complementary methodologies (non-parametric and 
2 We use the risk factors (market, -rm-, size –SMB-, book-to-market –HML-, and momentum –PR1YR) 
developed by Gregory et al. (2013) for the UK market, which are obtained from the Xfi Centre for 




                                                          
parametric) in order to provide a robust analysis. Some authors indicate that non-
parametric methods, based on contingency tables, present some limitations. Cortez et al. 
(1999) indicate that the results of contingency tables for small samples should be 
interpreted with caution. Cuthbertson et al. (2010) point out that contingency tables are 
not easy for investors to interpret. Matallín-Sáez et al. (2016) find that this methodology 
usually finds persistence too easily, and these authors use the parametric method in a 
second stage to overcome this problem. Matallín-Sáez et al. (2016) find that both 
methods are important to estimate persistence, given their complementarity. Therefore, 
following these authors, we apply both parametric and non-parametric methods to 
verify the robustness of our persistence results. 
The non-parametric method is based on the analysis of contingency tables, as in 
Brown and Goetzmann (1995), Malkiel (1995), Kahn and Rudd (1995), Silva et al. 
(2005), Elyasiani and Jia (2011), and Matallín-Sáez et al. (2016), among others. This 
methodology compares performance rankings in two consecutive periods and identifies 
two sub-sets, “winners” (W) and “losers” (L), on the basis of the median criterion. A 
manager can be allocated to one of these four categories: Winner in both periods (WW), 
Winner in the first period and Loser in the second period (WL), Loser in the first period 
and Winner in the second period (LW), or Loser in both periods (LL). If there is 
evidence of positive persistence, we would expect to observe more managers in either 
the WW or LL categories.  
We test the statistical significance of this phenomenon using several statistical 
methods: the Z-test of Malkiel (1995), the odds ratio of Brown and Goetzmann (1995), 
and the chi-square statistic of Kahn and Rudd (1995). 
The Z-test of Malkiel (1995) is collected in the following expression: 
 )1(/)(= p-npnp-YZ  (3) 
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where Z is the statistical variable and follows a normal distribution (0,1), Y is 
the number of winner managers in two consecutive periods, n is the sum of the winners 
(WW) and losers (LL) in two consecutive periods, and p is the theoretical percentage 
when there is no persistence; that is, 0.5. 
The odds ratio, defined by Brown and Goetzmann (1995), is as follows: 
 WLxLW
WWxLL
OR =  (4) 
Under the null hypothesis of no persistence, the odds ratio will equal one. A 
significantly positive odds ratio provides evidence of persistence in performance, and a 
significantly negative odds ratio provides evidence of reversal in persistence 







=  (5) 
where
)+1(+)/1(+)/1(+)/1(=)ln( LLLWWLWWσ OR .  













χ   (6) 
Where Oij is the actual frequency of the ith row and jth column, and Eij is the 
expected frequency of the ith row and jth column of the contingency table. 
On the other hand, the parametric methodology, initially proposed by Carhart 
(1997), is also called the recursive portfolio approach, and is one of the most commonly 
methodologies used in the financial literature (see, e.g., Bollen and Busse 2005; 
Kosowski et al. 2006; Busse et al. 2010; Fama and French 2010, and Matallín-Sáez et 
al. 2016). This method is based on comparing current and past performance and 
analyzing if managers are able to reach similar results over time. Consequently, if there 
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is persistence, managers investing in the worst (best) funds in the past should show 
worse (better) performance in the future. 
As in previously literature, at the beginning of each year we form five equal-
weighted portfolios of pension fund managers, using the lagged one-year manager 
performance (quintiles 5 and 1 show the best and worst performers, respectively). The 
holding period of the portfolios is one year; therefore, we repeat this process each year. 
This produces a time series of annual performance on each quintile portfolio from 2001 
to 2014; that is, each portfolio is a dynamic strategy that rebalances managers according 
to their prior performance. Finally, we test the differential performance between the top 
and bottom managers. 
2.3. Relationship between manager performance and manager characteristics. 
 To analyze the importance of manager characteristics for manager performance, 
in this section we study the influence of several manager attributes (gender, tenure, 
number of non-domestic equity funds managed, and number of domestic equity funds 
managed) on three performance measures (CAPM alpha, four-factor alpha and net 
excess return). Financial literature shows diverse influence of the aforementioned 
managerial attributes on fund performance. Prior studies (Hinz et al. 1997, Dwyer et al. 
2002, Watson and Robinson 2003) find gender differences in investing attitudes, 
although Powell and Ansic (1997) and Niessen-Ruenzi and Ruenzi (2015) find that 
gender does not influence on the ability to perform. On the other hand, several authors, 
like Golec (1996) and Ding and Wermers (2012), show that, in general, longer tenure is 
associated with better performance. Nonetheless, Ding and Wermers (2012) find that 
managers with longer tenure outperform (underperform) in large (small) funds. 
Moreover, the distinction between the number of UK domestic equity funds managed 
versus the number of non-UK domestic equity funds managed allows us to study the 
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level of specialization of our managers. Zambrana and Zapatero (2016) identify distinct 
manager skills based on manager responsibilities. These authors show that those 
managers with market timing abilities should be assigned to generalist responsibilities, 
that is, they are competent to run funds of several investment vocations, while managers 
with stock-picking abilities should handle specialist responsibilities running funds with 
one investment objective. 
To analyze the impact of manager characteristics on fund performance, we 















where Manager_Performanceit is the CAPM alpha, four-factor alpha or net 
excess return of manager i in year t; Genderit is a dummy variable that indicates the 
gender of manager i in year t and takes the value of one when the funds are managed by 
a female and zero otherwise; Tenure indicates the number of years of experience of 
manager i in year t; #funds ex-UKit indicates the number of non-domestic equity funds 
managed by manager i in year t: that is, the number of funds managed except those 
funds that invest in UK domestic equity; #UK fundsit indicates the number of domestic 
equity funds managed by manager i in year t; Fund age is a fund control variable that 
indicates the average age of the funds managed by manager i in year t; and εit is the 
error term.  
When a manager handles several funds and all of them are UK domestic equity 
pension funds (the category studied), this manager is defined as a specialist because 
he/she focuses on just the investment category analyzed in this paper; consequently, the 
#funds ex-UKit variable takes a value of zero. A manager is defined as a generalist when 
the number of funds managed is not the same as the number of UK domestic equity 
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funds managed, that is, the manager is responsible for funds of different investment 
categories (Custodio et al. 2013; Zambrana and Zapatero 2016). 
We further study the influence of market conditions on the prior model. Prior 
literature finds distinctive fund performance in bull and bear markets. Capocci et al. 
(2005) find that US hedge funds outperform the market during bullish periods and do 
not underperform in bearish periods. On the contrary, Kosowski (2011) finds better 
mutual fund performance in recessions than in booms. In booms, information (generally 
positive news) is fairly symmetrically distributed in the market; however, in recessions, 
the information asymmetry increases because some firms reveal biased information in 
case of bad news. Additionally, skilled managers, usually better informed than the 
average investor, may be even better informed in crises and, hence, take advantage of 
this information to outperform. Glode (2011) justifies outperformance of mutual funds 
in recessions because the consumption marginal utility of investors is higher in such 
periods.  
We develop model (8) from model (7) by including an annual dummy variable 
that equals one in a bull market and zero otherwise. We classify the sampled years into 
















where Dbull is a dummy variable that equals one in a bull market and zero 
otherwise. The rest of the variables are as defined in model (7). 
 
 
3 Specifically, 2001, 2002, 2008 and 2011 are considered as bear years, whereas the rest of the sampled 
years are bull years. 
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2.4. Robustness analysis: managers’ specialization. 
We further focus on the specialization importance and develop a robustness 
analysis to examine whether the specialist and generalist managers perform differently. 
Managers vary the management strategies among the funds with different investment 
vocations; however, among the funds with one investment vocation (UK equity), the 
management strategy should also differ according to the fund style (value versus growth 
UK equity funds). Monitoring funds of several investment styles also requires 
additional attention and time than monitoring funds of the same investment style; as a 
result, manager’s performance may be affected.  
To study the effect of handling funds of one/several investment styles, we 
redefine the meaning of specialist and generalist variables in models (7) and (8) to 
analyze in more detail the consequences, in terms of performance, of assigning specific 
responsibilities to these managers. 
Specifically, specialist managers are those running funds of one equity style and 
generalist managers are those running funds of several investment styles. The equity 
styles are obtained from the equity style box variable included in the Morningstar Direct 
database. This variable classifies funds into the following nine categories: Large Blend, 
Large Value, Large Growth, Mid Blend, Mid Value, Mid Growth, Small Blend, Small 
Value and Small Growth. 
Accordingly, we replace the generalist and specialist variables of models (7) and 
(8) by these two new variables: #UKfunds_different stylesit, which indicates the number 
of UK equity funds with different investment styles managed by manager i in year t, 
and #UKfunds_same styleit, which indicates the number of UK equity funds managed by 
manager i in year t with the same investment style. If this variable takes the value of 
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zero, the manager will be considered a generalist manager and otherwise a specialist 
manager. 





























Therefore, when a manager handles funds of several styles, the manager is 
considered a generalist, and when a manager only handles UK domestic equity pension 
funds of the same investment style, this manager is defined as a specialist because 
he/she focuses on one investment style; consequently, in this last case, the 
#UKfunds_different stylesit variable takes a value of zero. The remaining variables of 
models (9) and (10) are defined as in models (7) and (8), respectively. 
3. UK pension fund market and data sample. 
The worldwide pension fund industry has grown remarkably over the past 
decades. Global pension fund investment reached USD 25.2 trillion of assets under 
management at the end of 2014 (OECD 2015), with USD 14.146 trillion invested in the 
United States and USD 2.684 trillion in the United Kingdom. 
The UK pension fund industry deserves scholars’ and practitioners’ attention 
because it is the second largest pension fund market in the world, representing 96% of 
the British GDP. One reason for this expansion is the low level of state pensions until 
the mid-1990s. Although state pensions increased from then on, investment in private 
pensions continues to experience strong growth. Pension funds are currently the main 
investment vehicle for household savings, and 49.8% of household savings were 
invested in pension funds and insurance in 2014 (INVERCO 2015). It is remarkable that 
the foreign investment of pension funds was only 27.7% of the total investment in 2014 
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(OECD 2015); the equity pension fund investment category represented 21.8% of total 
investment (OECD 2015), and the domestic equity pension funds were close to 38% of 
the equity pension funds. 
Our database comprises all UK domestic equity pension funds. The data are 
obtained from Morningstar Direct database, which provides comprehensive information 
about fund returns and fund characteristics, such as inception date and manager history. 
For pension funds with different share classes, we aggregate share classes on portfolio 
level because they have the same portfolio composition and manager. We keep the 
observation of the oldest share class for the funds’ qualitative attributes (name, 
objective and inception date).4 We exclude all pension funds that belong to the index 
fund category to remove passively managed funds from our analysis, examining only 
actively managed funds. Our sample is free of survivorship bias because it includes all 
UK domestic equity pension funds existing in a certain month during the time period 
analyzed. The final sample is composed of 287 pension funds, which are managed by 
269 different managers from January 2000 to September 2014.  
Some descriptive statistics of the sample are shown in Tables 1 and 2. Table 1 
shows statistics of return and performance of UK pension fund managers (panel A) and 
the risk factors used (panel B). Panel A shows that the monthly average manager net 
return is 0.65% during the period studied. The performance measures (monthly CAPM 
and four-factor alphas) are also positive over the period studied, showing monthly 
manager alphas of 0.34% and 0.58%, respectively. Similarly, the Sharpe ratio is, on 
average, positive (0.0259). Panel B shows the risk factor statistics. We observe positive 
returns, on average, in all risk factors, except in the momentum factor. 
 
 
4 The oldest share class in the fund is usually the first established by the fund company. 
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Table 1.  Descriptive statistics. 
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics (average, standard deviation, minimum, maximum, 10% and 
90% percentiles) of manager net return and manager performance variables (panel A) and the 
risk factors used (panel B) from 2000 to 2014. 
Panel A: Manager return and performance statistics 





Manager return 0.65% 0.74% -2.43% 6.37% -0.05% 1.32% 
Manager CAPM alpha 0.34% 0.49% -3.13% 2.02% -1.12% 1.66% 
Manager 4-factor alpha 0.58% 0.62% -1.26% 4.11% -0.74% 2.55% 
Sharpe ratio 0.0259 0.0210 -0.0988 0.093 0.0086 0.0524 









Risk-free asset  0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0002 0.00002 0.0002 
Market factor  0.0001 0.0117 -0.0836 0.0920 -0.0125 0.0123 
Size factor  0.0001 0.0079 -0.0630 0.0356 -0.0084 0.0087 
Book-to-market factor  0.0001 0.0069 -0.0402 0.0578 -0.0068 0.0075 
Momentum factor  -0.0005 0.0092 -0.0813 0.0599 -0.0099 0.0084 
 
Table 2 shows the distribution of the managers and funds over the years 
analyzed. Our sample is based on a total number of 269 distinct managers and a total 
number of 287 distinct funds.5 The maximum (minimum) number of funds is 260 (69) 
in 2013 (2000). The maximum (minimum) number of managers analyzed is 168 (60) in 
2013 (2000). The average number of funds managed by a manager is 1.74 funds.6 As 
can be seen in Table 2, the majority of managers run between 1 and 3 funds, some of 
them run between 4 and 6 funds, and a minority run more than 7 funds. Additionally, 
the sample is formed by more male managers (a total of 244 male managers versus a 
total of 25 female managers), and specialist managers (a total of 126 specialist managers 
versus 143 generalist managers). The average manager tenure in a fund is over 7 years, 
and the fund age is, on average, 8 years. 
 
5 Our database is free of survivorship bias; therefore, the funds and managers vary over the years, 
appearing and disappearing over the sample period. 
6 Note that the mutual funds of the sample can be single-managed or team-managed. 
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Table 2. Distribution of managers and funds by year. 
Table 2 shows the distribution of several variables analyzed by year; specifically, the number of funds (# funds), the number of managers (# managers), the 
average number of funds managed by a manager (average of # funds by manager), the number of managers running 3 funds or less funds, between 4 and 6 
funds, between 7 and 9 funds, and more than 10 funds, the number of male and female managers, the number of generalist and specialist managers according 
to the fund investment category, the manager tenure (in years), and the fund age (in years). The last row shows if the market is considered bullish or bearish. 
 
 
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Average 
# funds 69 79 113 116 128 147 172 195 197 233 226 227 236 260 251 176.6 
# managers 60 68 91 95 107 120 139 153 155 175 163 162 161 168 158 132 
Average of # funds by manager 1.28 1.44 1.63 1.62 1.60 1.64 1.62 1.73 1.72 1.78 1.86 1.91 2.03 2.11 2.22 1.74 
# managers running =< 3 funds 59 66 86 89 101 111 130 140 142 161 149 147 142 148 135 120 
# managers running 4-6 funds 1 2 4 5 5 8 8 12 11 12 11 12 14 16 18 9 
# managers running 7-9 funds 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 3 4 2 
# managers running >=10 funds 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 
# male 54 61 84 88 95 104 122 135 135 154 142 142 143 152 141 117 
# female 6 7 7 7 12 16 17 18 20 21 21 20 18 16 17 15 
# generalist (inv. category) 7 16 23 25 27 28 32 39 36 41 44 43 43 47 46 33 
# specialist (inv. category) 53 52 68 70 80 92 107 114 119 134 119 119 118 121 112 99 
Manager tenure (years) 7 7 6 6 6 6 7 7 7 8 8 9 9 10 11 7.6 
Fund age (years) 3 3 4 4 5 6 6 7 8 9 10 10 11 12 13 8 
Bull/Bear Bull Bear Bear Bull Bull Bull Bull Bull Bear Bull Bull Bear Bull Bull Bull   
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Figure 1 shows the non-parametric kernel estimation of the performance (CAPM 
and four-factor alphas) distributions. This figure shows that the average performance 
and most part of both distributions display positive performance. The CAPM and four-
factor alpha distributions are centered on 0.003 and 0.006, respectively. Nonetheless, 
the distributions show that some managers present negative performance. 
Figure 1. Non-parametric kernel performance estimation. 
Figure 1shows the non-parametric (kernel) estimation of the performance distribution using as 
performance measure the CAPM alpha (solid line) and the four-factor alpha (dash line) from 







-.04 -.02 0 .02 .04
x




4.1. Manager performance persistence. 
The non-parametric results of the manager performance persistence are shown in 
Table 3. Table 3 is divided into two panels. Panels A and B show contingency tables 
considering the persistence in CAPM alphas and four-factor alphas, respectively. In the 
contingency tables, winner and loser managers are defined as greater (lower) than the 
median annual performance across all managers in a specific time period. The Malkiel 
(1995), Brown and Goetzmann (1995) and Kahn and Rudd (1995) annual statistical 
tests are also displayed.  
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Table 3. Non-parametric performance persistence results. 
Table 3 shows the performance persistence results of the non-parametric analysis. Panels A and 
B show the annual contingency tables and the persistence statistics tests (the Z-test of Malkiel, 
the Z-test of Brown and Goetzmann and the chi-square of Kahn and Rudd) from 2000 to 2014. 
WW represents winner managers in both periods, WL shows Winner in the first period and 
Loser in the second period, LW shows Loser in the first period and Winner in the second period, 
and LL means Loser in both periods. Panels A and B show the persistence considered as a 
performance measure the CAPM alpha and the four-factor alpha, respectively. *,**, and *** 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A. Performance persistence (CAPM alpha)    
  WW WL LW LL Malkiel Z-test B&G Z-test K&R 
2χ -test 
2000-2001 22 8 8 21 2.56** 3.37*** 12.39*** 
2001-2002 22 12 13 20 1.71* 2.05** 4.46** 
2002-2003 10 21 21 9 -1.98** -2.87*** 8.70*** 
2003-2004 33 14 14 33 2.77*** 3.80*** 15.36*** 
2004-2005 36 18 14 31 2.45** 3.44*** 13.20*** 
2005-2006 40 18 23 34 2.89*** 3.04*** 10.53*** 
2006-2007 28 48 38 17 -2.29** -3.57*** 16.21*** 
2007-2008 53 17 17 53 4.30*** 5.77*** 37.03*** 
2008-2009 29 55 45 18 -2.84*** -4.31*** 22.12*** 
2009-2010 49 28 30 46 2.39** 2.96*** 9.12*** 
2010-2011 40 46 35 29 -0.65 -0.99 4.19** 
2011-2012 36 42 43 34 -0.68 -1.20 1.52 
2012-2013 60 16 16 60 5.05*** 6.64*** 50.95*** 
2013-2014 41 37 37 40 0.45 0.56 0.33 
Panel B. Performance persistence (four-factor alpha) 
 
WW WL LW LL Malkiel Z-test B&G Z-test K&R
2χ -test 
2000-2001 15 15 15 14 0.00 -0.13 0.05 
2001-2002 27 9 7 24 3.00*** 4.04*** 18.67*** 
2002-2003 22 20 20 21 0.31 0.33 0.13 
2003-2004 37 10 10 37 3.94*** 5.19*** 31.02*** 
2004-2005 38 12 13 36 3.68*** 4.69*** 24.35*** 
2005-2006 40 18 18 39 2.89*** 3.91*** 16.10*** 
2006-2007 31 39 35 26 -0.96 -1.49 2.83* 
2007-2008 36 34 35 35 0.24 0.17 0.06 
2008-2009 27 47 48 25 -2.32** -3.50*** 12.65*** 
2009-2010 43 34 34 42 1.03 1.37 1.90 
2010-2011 34 41 41 34 -0.81 -1.14 1.31 
2011-2012 27 51 51 27 -2.72*** -3.78*** 14.77*** 
2012-2013 62 14 14 62 5.51*** 7.11*** 60.63*** 





Panel A shows significant positive persistence in the manager rankings for 8 of 
the 15 annual periods and is especially concentrated in the bullish period from 2003 to 
2006. Managers repeating as winners or losers are higher than the number of managers 
that change their status.7 Negative persistence appears in 2002–2003, 2006–2007 and 
2008–2009; that is, managers significantly change from winners to losers, or vice versa, 
in trend reversals. Lack of persistence is found in 2011–2012 and 2013–2014. Panel B 
shows persistence in a lower number of periods and is mainly clustered from 2003–
2006 and 2012–2013.  
These persistence results are not conclusive, as prior financial literature. 
However, both panels show persistence patterns affected by market conditions. Positive 
persistence is mainly displayed in bull periods (2003-2006 and 2012-2013) and negative 
persistence or absence of it appears in bear periods (2008-2009 and 2011-2012). Hence, 
some managers present superior skills, and their positive performance is not due to luck; 
nevertheless, these managers have trouble adapting to market recessions and the past 
positive performance persistence ceases. 
The persistence results of the parametric methodology are shown in Table 4 
(CAPM alphas in Panel A and four-factor alphas in Panel B). Panel A shows that the 
top managers in a given year present the highest performance in the next year (quintile 
5) in 7 of the 15 years analyzed (2001, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2008, 2010 and 2013). This 
result shows evidence of certain persistence in the performance of the best managers. 
Similarly, bottom managers in a given year present the worst performance in the 
subsequent year in 9 of the 15 years analyzed (quintile 1), showing persistence in loser 
managers, too. The mean difference test between top and bottom managers is 
7 We observe some disparity between the number of winners and losers in several years; for example, in 
the years 2004–2005, 2005–2006, 2006–2007, 2008–2009 and 2010–2011 of Panel A, Table 3. These 
results are due to the fact that the median performance is achieved by several managers, as they are 
managing the same fund at the same time. 
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significantly positive from 2000–2014, which confirms that the higher performance of 
the best managers is not likely to be result of luck. Panel B also shows some degree of 
persistence, but to a lesser extent than in Panel A. Top (bottom) managers are the best 
(worst) performers in seven (seven) years, and the average mean difference between top 
and bottom managers is significantly positive. 
Comparing the persistence results of both methods, we note that the negative 
persistence found in Table 3 is attributable to a generalized negative manager 
performance (Table 4) in bearish periods, especially when considering CAPM alpha as 
performance measure (panel A of Tables 3 and 4). Consistent with this, Matallín-Sáez et 
al. (2016) find lower persistence in US mutual funds from 2008 to 2015, period in 
which funds achieve the worst performance. In short, our results show the existence of 
superior managers, in line with prior literature in the UK (Brown et al. 1997) and US 
pension fund markets (Christopherson et al. 1998). However, manager performance and 
persistence vary over time, which may explain the lack of medium and long term 






Table 4. Parametric performance persistence results. 
Table 4 shows the performance persistence results of the parametric analysis. Panels A and B 
show the average CAPM and four-factor alphas (%) from 2000 to 2014, respectively, taking 
into account the quintile manager ranking of the prior year. Quintiles 5 and 1 show the highest 
and lowest performance, respectively. The last two rows show the average performance in each 
quintile and the average difference between top and bottom quintiles. The significance levels of 
the difference in means are based on t-tests. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels, respectively. 
Panel A. Performance persistence (CAPM alpha, %) 
 
Quintile 5 Quintile 4 Quintile 3 Quintile 2 Quintile 1 
2001 -0.24 -0.50 -0.24 -1.06 -1.67 
2002 -0.99 -0.56 -0.86 -0.96 -1.58 
2003 0.98 1.30 1.46 1.14 2.21 
2004 1.19 0.84 0.57 0.40 0.11 
2005 1.27 0.94 0.46 0.64 0.30 
2006 1.16 1.01 0.31 0.39 0.24 
2007 -0.88 -0.52 -0.30 -0.42 -0.21 
2008 -1.23 -0.130 -1.58 -2.24 -2.52 
2009 0.90 1.00 0.98 1.04 2.95 
2010 1.87 0.92 0.49 0.60 0.25 
2011 -0.39 -0.41 -0.02 -0.20 -0.01 
2012 0.66 1.03 0.71 0.97 1.32 
2013 2.09 1.59 1.27 0.80 0.60 
2014 -0.14 0.01 0.27 0.09 0.03 
Average 0.45 0.38 0.25 0.08 0.14 
Q5-Q1 0.30*         
Panel B. Performance persistence (four-factor alpha, %) 
  Quintile 5 Quintile 4 Quintile 3 Quintile 2 Quintile 1 
2001 0.67 1.41 0.74 1.11 0.58 
2002 1.96 1.39 1.07 0.29 -0.24 
2003 0.08 0.27 0.24 0.06 0.75 
2004 0.80 0.38 -0.13 -0.31 -0.21 
2005 0.84 0.09 -0.48 -0.39 -0.69 
2006 1.31 0.57 0.05 0.02 -0.08 
2007 0.19 0.48 0.16 0.34 0.46 
2008 -0.40 -0.08 -0.47 0.03 -0.70 
2009 -0.65 -0.71 -0.92 -0.55 2.06 
2010 1.88 0.92 0.53 0.59 0.25 
2011 3.39 3.44 3.87 3.89 3.87 
2012 -0.19 0.06 -0.15 0.46 0.36 
2013 1.34 0.44 0.27 -0.17 -0.25 
2014 0.14 0.64 0.65 0.73 0.70 
Average 0.81 0.67 0.39 0.43 0.49 





4.2. Relationship between manager performance and manager characteristics. 
4.2.1. Parametric results. 
 In this section, we show the influence of manager characteristics on manager 
performance. Table 5 shows the results of models (7) and (8) in panels A and B, 
respectively, using different manager performance measures: CAPM alpha in estimation 
(1), four-factor alpha in estimation (2), and net excess return in estimation (3). Models 
are estimated by OLS with robust standard errors clustered by manager from 2000 to 
2014.8 T-statistics are in parentheses.  
 Panel A shows that gender does not significantly influence manager outcomes, 
consistent with prior works (Powell and Ansic 1997; Niessen-Ruenzi and Ruenzi 2015) 
that find no gender differences in performance. The coefficient of the #funds ex-UK 
variable is significantly negative in estimations (1) and (2); that is, manager 
performance is damaged when managers develop generalist responsibilities. As a 
consequence, manager specialization reports better performance. Managers that only 
run funds with one investment objective (domestic equity in our study) are able to focus 
on certain securities, extrapolating their knowledge to funds of the same investment 
objective. On the other hand, whether generalist managers do not devote enough time 
and energy to manage funds with multiple investment objectives, they may fail in the 
multi-tasking management. Estimation (2) also shows an inverse and statistically 
significant relationship between tenure and performance, indicating that greater 
experience has negative repercussions on performance. Porter and Trifts (1998) suggest 
that experienced managers become complacent, leading to a negative effect on 
performance because, as Kempf et al. (2014) note, managers with longer tenure have 
different standing within the organization. Kostovetsky (2010) indicates that the best 
8 We have also controlled for possible time-fixed effects, and the results are not affected. 
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managers often leave funds to work for hedge funds; thus, as Kempf et al. (2014) argue, 
a negative relation between experience and performance would exist among the 
remaining managers. 
In addition, estimations (1) and (2) show performance improvement with fund 
age, indicating that older funds have better managers. Pastor et al. (2015) find 
performance deterioration over the fund’s lifetime; however, this negative relation 
disappears by controlling for industry size and it turns marginally positive, which 
suggests that performance may improve as the fund age increases.  
Table 5. Relationship between manager performance and manager characteristics 
considering the investment vocation specialization.  
Table 5 shows the results of models (7) and (8) with different dependent variables: CAPM alpha 
(estimation 1), four-factor alpha (estimation 2), and net excess return (estimation 3). 
Specifically, panel A shows the results of model (7) and panel B shows the results of model (8). 
Models are estimated by OLS with robust standard errors clustered by manager from 2000 to 
2014. The regression also includes style fixed-effects as indicated in the last row of the Table. 
T-statistics are in parenthesis. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Manager characteristics-performance 
relationship 
Panel B: Manager characteristics-
performance and market conditions 
 
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
Gender -0.00002 0.0001 -0.0003 0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0002 
 
(-0.03) (0.08) (-0.41) (0.23) (-0.07) (-0.34) 
Tenure -0.0001 
-
0.0002*** 0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0002*** 0.0000 
 
(-1.29) (-2.69) (0.73) (-1.23) (-2.75) (0.7) 
#funds ex-UK -0.0003* -0.0003* -0.0002 -0.0003** -0.0003 -0.0002 
 
(-1.96) (-1.7) (-1.59) (-2.19) (-1.57) (-1.46) 
#UK funds 0.0004 0.0002 0.0000 0.0002 0.0003 0.0000 
 
(0.9) (0.37) (0.15) (0.49) (0.64) (-0.08) 
Fund age 0.0003*** 0.0003*** -0.0001 0.0001 0.0005*** -0.0001** 
 
(3.92) (3.31) (-1.39) (0.75) (5.34) (-1.98) 
Dbull 
   
0.0169*** -0.0133*** 0.0028*** 
 
   
(21.88) (-11.2) (5.06) 
Constant 0.0018* 0.0059*** 0.0001 -0.0088*** 0.0142*** -0.0007 
 (1.9) (5.71) (1.4) (-10.66) (11.24) (-0.85) 
R-squared 0.0184 0.0131 0.0152 0.3109 0.1426 0.0372 




To examine whether manager performance is influenced by market conditions, 
panel B shows the results of model (8) and displays similar results to Panel A, revealing 
that market conditions affect manager performance. The market-condition dummy is 
significantly positive in estimations (1) and (3); that is, managers obtain better CAPM 
alphas and excess returns in bullish markets. This result is in line with Capocci et al. 
(2005), who find outperformance of hedge funds during bullish periods. However, this 
variable turns negative when four-factor model style strategies (estimation 2) are 
considered; therefore, the prior higher performance in bull markets may be because 
managers take advantage of style strategies based on size, book-to-market and/or 
momentum strategies in bullish markets. Additionally, the better results in bear periods 
are consistent with Glode (2011) and Kosowski (2011) and may suggest that it is easy to 
beat the market in bear periods by reducing the market exposure. Silva and Cortez 
(2016) finds higher performance of green funds in crisis periods compared to non-crisis 
periods as their market exposure changes over time. Accordingly, manager 
characteristics influence to a lesser extent than the fund type managed on manager 
performance.   
 We apply a robustness analysis to further examine the differences in 
performance between specialists and generalists. We redefine when a fund manager can 
be considered a specialist manager, based on the investment style of the funds managed. 
Table 6 shows the results of models (9) and (10). Both panels confirm the conclusions 
reached on Table 5 with regard to gender, tenure and fund age. Furthermore, both 
panels of Table 6 show significant and negative coefficients on the generalist-manager 
variable (#UKfunds_different stylesit), and positive and significant coefficients on the 
specialist-manager variable (#UKfunds_same styleit), except in estimation (2) of panel 
A, which confirms the better performance of specialists.  
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Table 6. Relationship between manager performance and manager characteristics 
considering the fund style specialization. 
Table 6 shows the results of models (9) and (10) with different dependent variables: CAPM 
alpha (estimation 1), four-factor alpha (estimation 2), and net excess return (estimation 3). 
Specifically, panel A shows the results of model (9) and panel B shows the results of model 
(10). Models are estimated by OLS with robust standard errors clustered by manager from 2000 
to 2014. The regression also includes style fixed-effects as indicated in the last row of the Table. 
T-statistics are in parenthesis. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Manager characteristics-performance relationship Panel B: Manager characteristics-performance and market conditions 
 
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
Gender -0.0005 -0.0004 -0.0007 -0.0003 -0.0006 -0.0007 
 
(-0.66) (-0.36) (-1.25) (-0.37) (-0.54) (-1.15) 
Tenure -0.0001 -0.0002*** 0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0002*** 0.0000 
 
(-1.25) (-2.65) (0.8) (-1.17) (-2.7) (0.78) 
#UKfunds_different 
stylesit 
-0.0005*** -0.0005*** -0.0004*** -0.0005*** -0.0005** -0.0004*** 
(-2.76) (-2.6) (-2.75) (-2.99) (-2.47) (-2.77) 
#UKfunds_same 
styleit, 
0.0006** 0.0005 0.0006** 0.0004* 0.0006* 0.0005** 
(2.24) (1.42) (2.5) (1.71) (1.84) (2.41) 
Fund age 0.0003*** 0.0003*** -0.0001 0.0000 0.0005*** -0.0001** 
 
(3.94) (3.28) (-1.64) (0.66) (5.34) (-2.25) 
Dbull 
   
0.0169*** -0.0134*** 0.0028*** 
 
   
(21.84) (-11.21) (5.04) 
Constant 0.0027*** 0.0065*** 0.0016** -0.0082*** 0.0151*** -0.0002 
 (2.8) (6.72) (2.17) (-9.61) (11.93) (-0.25) 
R-squared 0.0214 0.0149 0.0222 0.3132 0.1448 0.044 
Style effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
 
4.2.2. Non-parametric results. 
 The prior section shows that some manager characteristics affect manager 
performance. We further apply a non-parametric analysis in this section to detect 
possible performance differences among each category of the manager characteristics 
analyzed.  
Table 7 shows the manager performance (CAPM alpha, four-factor alpha and 
net excess return), distinguishing among each category of gender —male or female— 
(panel A), experience —high or low— (panel B), number of funds managed —one or 
several— (panel C), investment objective of the funds managed —specialist or 
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generalist— (panel D), and style of the funds managed —specialist or generalist— 
(panel E). To determine the categories of manager experience and the number of funds 
managed, we obtain the median of all manager observations. In the case of experience, a 
manager with low experience has been managing a fund for six years or less, and a 
manager with high experience has been handling a fund more than six years. The 
number of funds managed by a manager is divided between one and several funds, as 
the average is 1.7 funds (see Table 2). 
Table 7 shows that the differences in performance are not economically 
significant between men and women (panel A), between managers with less and more 
experience (panel B), and between managers running one or more funds (panel C). The 
statistically significant differences are detected among generalist and specialist 
managers taking into account the investment category of the funds managed (Panel D) 
and the style of the funds managed (panel E). Panel D shows that specialist managers 
obtain better performance (a CAPM alpha of 14 basis points higher), which is consistent 
with our prior results (Table 5). This finding confirms that manager specialization 
(running funds with one investment objective) allows managers to better understand the 
functioning of the funds, and the consequences of their investment strategies, leading to 
better performance (Zambrana and Zapatero 2016; Göricke 2016). Panel E confirms 
these conclusions; however, the higher performance of the specialist managers is only 








Table 7. Non-parametric analysis. Differential performance according to manager 
characteristics. 
Table 7 shows the average performance (CAPM alpha, four-factor alpha and net excess return 
in percentage) according to manager characteristics (gender, experience, number of funds 
managed and type of manager, i.e. specialist or generalist, from the period analyzed: 2000–
2014). Panel A shows the male and female manager performance and the difference between 
them. Panel B shows the performance of managers with high and low experience (more and less 
than six years of management in a fund) and their differences. Panel C shows the performance 
of managers handling one or several funds and the difference between them. Panel D shows the 
performance of specialist and generalist managers according to the fund investment category 
and their differences. Panel E shows the performance of specialist and generalist managers 
according to the fund style and their differences The significance levels of the differences in 










Panel A: Gender     
Male 0.36 0.56 0.11 
Female 0.35 0.55 0.32 
Difference 0.01 0.01 -0.21 
Panel B: Experience  
High 0.28 0.45 0.05 
Low 0.40 0.61 0.17 
Difference -0.13 -0.17 -0.12 
Panel C: Number of funds managed 
One 0.41 0.61 0.14 
Several 0.26 0.47 0.10 
Difference 0.15 0.14 0.04 
Panel D: Investment category of the funds managed 
Specialist 0.39 0.59 0.14 
Generalist 0.25 0.47 0.03 
Difference 0.14* 0.11 0.11 
Panel E: Style of the funds managed 
Specialist_style 0.32 0.57 0.01 
Generalist_style 0.28 0.54 -0.06 
Difference 0.04 0.02 0.07* 
 
We also assess the impact of market conditions in the non-parametric analysis. 
Table 8 shows the performance by manager characteristic distinguishing between bull 
and bear periods. The results of Table 8 verify no significant performance differences 
for the manager gender (panel A) and the manager experience (panel B). Managers 
running one fund (panel C) obtain 4 basis points more performance (CAPM alpha) than 
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managers running several funds in bullish periods. Specialist managers, according to the 
fund investment category (panel D), are able to achieve better performance than 
generalist managers in bullish markets. The differences are statistically significant in all 
performance measures. Specialists present a performance between 17 and 10 basis 
points larger (CAPM and four-factor alphas) than generalists in bull markets. Zambrana 
and Zapatero (2016) and Göricke (2016) find that pickers are specialists who narrow 
down their focus into segments in which they have expertise, performing fundamental 
analysis and achieving better allocation. Additionally, Kacperczyk et al. (2014) find 
higher stock picking skill in booms. Our results, in line with these works, reveal that 
specialists outperform in booms. Nevertheless, generalist managers display a non-
significant higher performance (less negative CAPM and 4-factor alphas) and a 
significant higher net excess returns in bear markets. This finding is consistent with 
Zambrana and Zapatero (2016), who find that generalists are able to develop timing 
abilities because they possess a more general view of the market and access more 
information.  
In this line, Kacperzyk et al. (2014) also find higher evidence of market timing 
in bearish markets. The timing skill is especially important in recessions because 
managers demonstrate that they invest in the correct moment, despite the convulsive 
conditions. Market-timers intend to anticipate the market, increasing (decreasing) their 
market exposure in bullish (bearish) markets; consequently, these managers are able to 
obtain better performance in bearish markets by reducing their market exposure while 
the market is 100% invested in equities. On the other hand, stock-pickers intend to beat 
the market in both bullish and bearish markets; however, these managers seem to be 
able to outperform only in bullish markets. Panel E does not show significant 
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performance differences between specialists and generalists when considering the 
investment style of the funds managed. 
Table 8. Differential performance according to manager characteristics and market 
conditions. 
Table 8 shows the performance (CAPM alpha, four-factor alpha and net excess return in 
percentage) by manager characteristic and its difference, by distinguishing between bull and 
bear periods. Panel A shows the manager performance by gender (male or female). Panel B 
shows the manager performance according to manager experience (high or low). Panel C shows 
manager performance in relation to the number of funds managed (one or several). Panel D 
shows the performance of generalist and specialist managers according to the fund investment 
category. Panel E shows the performance of generalist and specialist managers according to the 
fund style. The significance levels of the difference in means are based on t-tests. *, ** and *** 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
  CAPM alpha (%) 4-Factor alpha (%) Net excess return (%) 
 Bull Bear Bull Bear Bull Bear 
Panel A: Performance by gender.   
Male 0.76 -0.99 0.27 1.52 0.07 -0.21 
Female 0.75 -0.98 0.28 1.55 0.06 -0.19 
Difference 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.01 -0.02 
Panel B: Performance by experience. 
High 0.73 -0.91 0.25 1.64 0.08 -0.20 
Low 0.78 -1.03 0.29 1.46 0.05 -0.22 
Difference -0.05 0.12 -0.04 0.18 0.02 0.02 
Panel C: Performance by number of funds.  
One 0.75 -1.01 0.25 1.61 0.08 -0.20 
Several 0.71 -0.98 0.25 1.53 0.05 -0.21 
Difference 0.04* -0.02 0.00 0.09 0.03 0.01 
Panel D: Performance by investment category of the funds managed. 
Specialist 0.75 -1.05 0.28 1.51 0.09 -0.26 
Generalist 0.59 -0.80 0.18 1.59 -0.03 -0.08 
Difference 0.17*** -0.25 0.1* -0.08 0.12** -0.18* 
Panel E: Performance according to the style of the funds managed 
Specialist_style 0.72 -0.98 0.24 1.62 0.07 -0.18 
Generalist_style 0.69 -1.00 0.29 1.33 0.01 -0.27 
Difference 0.03 0.03 -0.05 0.29 0.06 0.08 
 
Our results show that, in general, specialist managers outperform generalists; 
however, managers’ skills vary with market conditions, hence, manager performance 
persistence is not observed in the long-term. Accordingly, whether management 
companies want to take advantage of the differential skills among managers, they 
should identify the managers that create value in each market phase, employing more 
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specialists in booms and generalists in recessions. Understanding the limitations of 
multi-tasking employees may help management companies to realize the importance of 
specialization and allocate managers according to their abilities and the market 
conditions.  
Finally, we analyze whether the change of the funds managed by a manager 
affect manager performance. We undertake this analysis because this work focuses on 
managers, instead of funds; therefore, managers may also develop specialization skills 
handling the same funds over time. In Table 9 we compare the performance of the 
managers that do not change the funds managed over the sample period (non-fund 
changes) with the performance of the managers who change the funds handled over our 
sample period (fund changes). Our results show that 75% (202) of the managers do not 
change the funds managed over the period studied, revealing fund specialization of the 
managers analyzed, and 25% (67) of the managers experience some kind of fund change 
(increase/decrease of the number of funds under responsibility). Furthermore, the results 
do not reveal significant performance differences between these two groups of 
managers.  
Table 9. Manager performance considering the changes of the funds managed. 
Table 9 shows the number of managers and the manager performance and compares the 
managers that do not change the funds managed over the sample period analyzed (non-fund 
changes) with the managers that experience some change in the funds managed (fund changes). 
The significance levels of the difference in means are based on t-tests.  
 
  # managers CAPM alpha 4-factor alpha 
Non-fund changes 202 0.0035 0.0059 





The study and supervision of manager performance is an important issue for the 
different agents involved (e.g., sponsors, investors, managers, and authorities) in 
collective investment industries. Nevertheless, most of the existent studies analyze this 
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aspect from a fund perspective; that is, without considering that funds experience 
periodic manager substitutions and that the fund performance is the result of different 
managers over time, not the performance of a specific manager. In this paper, we first 
analyze the performance of pension fund managers over time. Specifically, we study the 
persistence of manager performance and the relationship between manager 
performance, manager characteristics and market conditions in a sample of UK equity 
pension fund managers. 
We find that some managers are persistently superior and add value for 
investors. Nevertheless, the results vary with market conditions and managers present 
problems adapting to bearish markets, displaying performance deterioration in these 
intervals. Our results also show that personal traits (gender and experience) influence on 
manager performance to a lesser extent than the management strategy (specialization 
versus non-specialization). Specifically, we support the existence of two types of 
managers (generalists and specialists). Managers running a single fund or funds with 
one investment objective (specialists) obtain, in general terms, better performance 
results. Specialist managers concentrate efforts, time and resources on specific tasks, so 
they are able to achieve better results. The disadvantage of generalist managers lies in 
overseeing funds with multiple investment objectives, which supposes that managers 
may not devote enough time and attention to each fund. Nonetheless, the endeavor of 
these managers differs with market conditions. Generalist managers achieve better 
performance in bearish markets, whereas specialists do so in bull periods, evidencing 
distinct skills among manager types.  
These results have important implications for the organization of pension fund 
management. Management companies may identify those managers who create value 
over the business cycle, helping in the manager selection decision-making. If fund 
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management companies allocate their employees considering the benefits and costs of 
specialization/generalization and the market conditions, manager performance and, thus, 
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